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CASENOTES
that this case is also distinguishable on the facts, since, as expressed by
the court: "The local statute . . . deals only with a question of costs,

respecting which Congress has not spoken"'' (emphasis supplied), whereas
the instant case involves a contractual period of limitations which has
been prescribed by the federal legislation on the subject.
Dissenting judge Mathews sets forth the opposing theory that the
federal statute has preempted the field in cases involving express receipts
which comply with the act. fie argues that a contrary state statute must
yield to the federal statute whether the conflict is between a contract in
compliance with the act and a longer state period,1 7 or one in compliance
with the act and a shorter state period.' 8
It is this writer's conclusion that the majority holding in this case
too liberally interprets the Transportation Act. It would seem that the
requirement of uniformity, which was a guiding star in this legislation,
demands that one period of limitation be fixed.'
The writer is of the
opinion that the result of the instant case deprives the federal restriction
of much of its practical effect.
It is submitted that an affirmative federal statute of limitations would
be desirable.
Herbert E. Saks

INJUNCTIONS--NUISANCE-CEMETERIES
The appellant home-owners sought to enjoin the operation of a
cemetery adjacent to their homes. The facts failed to show injury or
probable injury to health and the injunction was refused. Held, in
reversing the lower court, a cemetery in a residential section constitutes
a nuisance. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1954).
It is well settled that a cemetery is not a nuisance per se. A cemetery
16. Id. at 422.
17. Cf. Schiebel v. Agwilines, 156 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946) (similar statutory
provision applicable to ocean carriers). As said by this court on p. 638: "183b
is a declaration of Congressional policy as to lawful contractual time limitation and one
which in the interest of uniformity should be construed to exclude state statutes of
limitations."
18. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Chase, 109 Fla. 50, 146 So. 658 (1933) (case
involved bill of lading identical with that in case at bar). The court held: "Such contractual limitation . . . is valid and enforceable according to the intent ofi the federal
law. The federal law on the subject has superseded all state statutes to the contrary in
so far as interstate shipments of goods are concerned." cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Wauchula Truck Growers' Ass'n. 95 Fla. 392, 118 So. 52 (1928).
19. Cf. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 236 U.S. 662, 667 (1915);
Kansas City S.Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U.S. 133, 139 (1923).
1. Byran v. Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922 (1908); McDaniel v. Forrest
Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S.W. 874 (1923); Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Cemeteries Ass'n, 124 Cal. 344, 57 Pac. 153 (1899); Harper v. Nashville, 136
Ga. 141, 70 S.E. 1102 (1911); Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 i1l. 11, 185
N.E. 170; Villa Park v. \Vanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 147 N.E. 104
(1925); Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79 (1867); Payne v. Wayland, 131 Iowa 659,
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is not a nuisance because it is a constant reminder of death and has a
depressing effect on observers; 2 nor because it tends to depreciate the
value of the property in the vicinity;3 nor because it makes the locale
less attractive; 4 nor because it may be offensive to the aesthetic sense
of an adjoining home-owner. 5

It may, however, constitute a nuisance

when it contaminates the air, water, wells or springs in the surrounding
area. 6 \Vhethcr or not a cemetery is a nuisance is a question of fact,
determined by the circumstances of each case.7 Furthermore, before
injunctive relief will be granted to restrain the use of land as a cemetery
on the ground it constitutes a nuisance, it must be shown clearly and
conclusively that injury or probable injury to health and physical comfort
will result.8
An undertaking establishment likewise, is not a nuisance per se.9
However, as distinguished from a cemetery, when the operation of such
undertaking establishment in a residential section is mentally depressing
to the people of the immediate area, reminding them of death, impairing
their happiness and depreciating the value of their property, it constitutes
a nuisance. 10

109 N.W. 203 (1906); Dennery v. Hughes. 214 Miss. 687, 59 So.2d 316 (1952);
Young v. St. Martin's dhurch, 361 Pa. 505, 64 A.2d 814 (1949); Clinton Cemetery
Ass'n v. McAttee, 270 Okla. 160, 111 Pac. 392 (1910); Farb v. Thies, 250 S.W. 290
(Tex.Civ.App. 1923); lite v. Cashmere Cemetery Ass'n, 158 Wash. 421, 290 Pac.
1008 (1930).
2.Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 Ill,
11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933); Monk
v. Packard, 71 Me. 309, 36 Am.Rep. 315 (1880); Jones v. Highland Memorial Park,
242 S W.2d 250 (Tex.Civ.App.1951).
3. Milton v. Maples, 235 Ala. 446, 179 So. 519 (1938); Abbey Land Co. v.
San Mateo County, 167 Cal. 434, 139 Pac. 1068 (1914); Monk v. Packard, 71 Me 309,
36 Am.Rep. 315 (1880); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505, 64 A.2d 814 (1949);
Jones v. Highland Memorial Park, 242 S.V.2d 250 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951).
4.Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309, 36 Arn.Rep. 315 (1880): "Cemeteries are
not necessarily even shocking to the sense of ordinary persons. Many are rendered
attractive by whatever [means] appropriate art and skill can suggest."
5. Sutton v. Findley Cemetery Ass'n, 270 Ill. 11, 110 N.E. 315 (1915).
6. Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Cemetery Ass'u, 159 Ill. 385, 42 N.E. 891 (1896)
(The construction of a sewer pipe to undcrdrain the cemetery where the drainage entered
into and contaminated a stream was held a nuisance, even where itwas shown the
stream was already polluted by land surface drainage containing manure and other
harmful substances); Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 58 Neb. 94, 78 N.W.
488 (1899) (The health of the plaintiff was in danger by contamination of water
caused by burials).
7.Nelson v.Swedish E.L. Cemetery Ass'n, Ill Minn. 149, 126 N.W. 723 (1910).
8.McDaniel v.Forrest Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S.W. 874 (1923);
Rosehill Cemetery Co., v. Chicago, 352 Ill.
11, 185 N.E. 170, (1933); McCutchen v.
Blanton, 59 Miss. 116 (1881); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505, 64 A.2d

814 (1949).
9. 54 Am . JUR., Undertakers and Embalrners, § 7, P.512; 66 C.J.S. Nuiances,
72,,p. 819.
10. Jack v. 'orrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950); Leland v. Turner, 117
Kan. 294, 230 Pac. 1061 (1924); Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N.W. 507 (1917);
Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924); Cunningham v. Miller,
178 Wis. 22, 189 N.V. 531 (1922); contra, Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc.,
222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100 (1952) (Louisiana using the codal system and not adopting
common law authorities said: "A lawful business will not be enjoined merely because
it may be [later] conducted so as to become a nuisance.").

CASENOTES
Funeral homes and cemeteries are not generally considered to be so
similar that the same rule of law should apply to both." A cemetery is
merely an unpleasant reminder of that "undiscover'd country from whose
bourn no traveller returns." On the other hand, a funeral parlor is
concerned with the constant taking in and out of dead bodies, autopsies
and embalmings, morbid processions of caskets, bearers and mourners
for the dead.' 2 There is also the danger of permeation of noxious vapors
and odors into adjacent homes.' 3 In a decision, however, where the
funeral parlor was used only for ceremonies and not embalming or other

such purposes, it wAs held not to be a nuisance, even though located in
4
a residential section.'
In the instant case there was no danger to health and physical
comfort. Nevertheless, the court, by applying to cemeteries the rule
applicable to funeral homes, decided the home-owners should not be
deprived of the quiet and repose that home life normally offers. 5 In
reaching this conclusion the court apparently relied heavily on the fact
that being members of the colored race, the appellants were, by their
nature, overly sensitive to death and burials.'0 Such being the case, the
court felt the cemetery constituted a nuisance because of the severe
mental depressions it would cause the appellants. 7 In dissenting, Justice
Thomas said, ".

.

. this court should decline to decide the case on the

basis that members of the colored race are more affected by the funereal
atmosphere than the white race. .

.

. I cannot agree that what might be

a nuisance for one race would not be a nuisance for another."
To protect aesthetic senses and mental health, some jurisdictions have
barred cemeteries and funeral homes from residential sections on the
grounds it was a nuisance to persons of ordinary sensitivity.'8 Even these
jurisdictions hold that the cemetery or funeral home must be offensive
It. Dennery v. Hughes, 214 Miss. 687, 59 So.2d 316 (1952); Rick v. Cramp,
357 Pa. 831, 53 A.2d 84 (1945); Young v.St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505, 64 A.2d
814 (1949).
12. Dennery v. Hughes, 214 Miss. 687, 59 So.2d 316 (1952).
13. Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A,2d 705 (1950); Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich.
295, 164 N.W. 507 (1917); Beisel v. Crosby, 104 Neb. 644, 178 N. W. 277 (1920);
Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255 (1910).
14. Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Co., 103 Wash. 429, 74 Pac. 961 (1918).
15. The court here relied on Young v. Brown, 212 S.C. 136, 46 S.E. 2d 673 (1948)
where a complaint alleging a cemetery was a nuisance because it was a constant reminder
of death and depreciated the value of the adjacent property was held sufficient to state
a cause of action.
16. Although it is not expressly stated in the majority opinion, the offerings of
the dissenting justices manifest squarely what the court majority may have had in mind
in reaching their conclusion.
17. In contrast, it is interesting to note what the court said in Monk v. Packard,
71 Me. 309, 36 Am. Rep. 315 (1880): "Cemeteries are not necessarily even shocking
to the senses of ordinary persons . . . while to others of morbid or excited fancy or
imagination they become unpleasant and induce mental disquietude from association,
exaggerated by superstitious fears .... " (The court refused to enjoin the cemetery
on the ground it caused personal discomfort.)
18. McGowan v. May, 185 Ga. 805, 196 S.E. 705 (1938); Kundinger v. Bagnasco,
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and depressing to persons of normal sensibilities and not those who are
hypersensitive and extra-fastidious, or possess an overly superstitious
nature.19 While it is true that a cemetery and a funeral home have many
comparable characteristics, it still rests upon the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine whether a nuisance in fact exists.20 The instant
decision appears to be unfounded in fact and in law since no evidence
was produced to show actual or probable danger to health and physical
comfort. 21 It seems repugnant to the principles of equity to arbitrarily
declare a cemetery a nuisance for psychic reasons only. 22

It represents

the inequitable situation whereby a person is deprived of the right 2 a
to reasonably use his land for a lawful and necessary enterprise, 24 when
no harmi conies to others.
Paul Low

REAL PROPERTY-POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTERCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
Two suits were brought by purchasers of tax deeds against a holder
of a possibility of reverter. Relief in the first case was sought under a
lorida statute' which was enacted to cancel reverter clauses of unlimited
duration, in plats and deeds, which have been in existence more than
21 years. The second suit sought relief under the Murphy Act, 2 which
298 Mich. 15, 298 N.W. 386 (1941); Streett v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W.
494 (1927); Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927).
19. Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255 (1910); Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W, 531 (1922).
20. Nelson v. Swedish E.L. Cemetery Ass'n, 111 Minn. 149, 126 N.W. 723

(1910

21: Testimony proved that the atmosphere and the well water near the cemetery
would not be contaminated by the interment of dead bodies. Where there is no injury
or danger of injury, there should be no restraints placed upon the operation of a lawful
business.
22. "To complaints based upon purely psychic objections, equity gives no heed,
for it does not regard the melancholy reflections that may be engendered in sensitive
minds by the close proximity of a cemetery as sufficient to brand it a nuisance within
the legal meaning of the term." Dennery v. Hughes, 214 Miss. 687, 59 So.2d 316
(1952). 3 COOLEY, TORTS 180 (4th. Ed. 1933): "Cemeteries are not enjoined from
operation as nuisances because offensive to the sensibilities of those residing in the
vicinity"; BURDIcK's, LAw Or TORTs 488 (4th. Ed. 1926); "A cemetery is not a nuisance
because it offends the fancy, delicacy or fastidiousness of neighbors ....
"
23. "Relief by injunction is so severe . . . that it is not to be granted ... except
when the right to it is clearly and conclusively made out. To interfere with one's right
to use his own land for the production of what he pleases, in a caseJ of doubt, would
be a flagrant abuse of power." McCutchen v. Blanton, 59 Miss. 116 (1881).
24. ". . . a cemetery is not unlawful, for to provide for the repose of the dead
is just as lawful, and equally as necessary, as to provide for the health and comfort of
the living. The dead must be disposed of in some way, and burial in the earth . . .
seems most appropriate, and certainly is generally resorted to." Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W.
290 (Tex.Civ.App. 1923).
1. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951) (clause 2 reads: "All reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration embodied in any plat or deed executed more than twenty-one
years prior to the passage of this law conveying real estate or any interest therein of the
State of Florida, be and the same are hereby cancelled and annulled and declared to be
of no further force and effect.")
2. Laws of Fla. 1937, c. 18296.

